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RECENT DECISIONS
Civil Rights-No STATE ACTION NECESSARY TO PROHIBIT RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION BY "PRIVATE" SCHOOLS- Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster
School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July 27, 1973).
Until recently,' 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 were virtually useless as
instruments with which to combat purely private racial discrimination.
2
Certainly, one of the principal reasons behind this was the Supreme
Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases3 wherein the Court restrictively
applied the thirteenth amendment,4 under which the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was enacted.' However, in 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that the
intention of Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to pro-
hibit private racial discrimination as well as racial discrimination under
color of law,6 and thereby vastly broadened the scope of the thirteenth
amendment.' The decision was based upon the Court's finding that 42
1. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. See Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study of Law In
Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. REv. 473, 504 (1971); Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L. REV. 475 (1969); Note, Section 1981 and Private
Discrimination: An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024,
1035-36 (1972); Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 615 (1969):
It undoubtedly came as a suprise to many lawyers to learn from the popular press that
two wide-sweeping statutory provisions dealing with civil rights had gone virtually
unused for a century. Id. at 615.
3. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
4. Id. at 21-22, 24. "The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds
entirely too narrow and artificial." Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Hemphill, State Action and Civil Rights, 23 MERCER L. REV. 519, 526 (1972); tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition
and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. Rav. 171, 203 (1951); see Kohl, The Civil
Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L.
REv. 272, 276 (1969).
6. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Referring to the Civil Rights Act of
1866, the Supreme Court made it clear that it was to prohibit all forms of racial discrimina-
tion:
In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt it and the contents of the debates
that preceded its passage, it is clear that the Act was designed to do just what its terms
suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not under color of law, with
respect to the rights enumerated therein-including the right to purchase or lease
property. Id. at 436.
7. Id. at 443:
At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thir-
teenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the
right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free
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U.S.C. § 1982 was originally a part of section one of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.' As a result of this decision, a number of actions were brought in
an effort to combat private racial discrimination.'" However, many of these
cases involved a contract issue," and were decided under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.12 The trend of judicial decisions involving Section 1981 indicates
that it also is being interpreted as derived from the Civil Rights Act of
1866, and is therefore applicable to private acts of racial discrimination.'3
man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise that
the Nation cannot keep.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970):
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.
9. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 (1968); see Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 27.
10. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 93 S. Ct. 1090 (1973); Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Brady v.
Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th
Cir. 1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v.
Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 911 (1970); Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929
(1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Rice v. Chrysler
Corp., 327 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856
(W.D.N.C. 1971); Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970);
Tennessee v. Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
11. See, e.g., Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Young v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of
Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Scott v.
Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Grier v. Specialized
Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalities, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
13. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 & n.28 (1968); Buchanan, Federal
Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IoWA L.
REv. 473 (1971); Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification
for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024 (1972); 23 VAND. L. REv. 413 (1970). Contra,
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afl'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d
1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla.
1970); Tennessee v. Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). For an historical analysis
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicating that it was not enacted to reach private discrimina-




Ultimately the Supreme Court will find a need to rule directly upon the
applicability of Section 1981 to private racial discrimination,14 and the case
of Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc. 5 may afford the Supreme
Court such an opportunity."6
Colin Gonzales' parents, interested in sending Colin to Fairfax-Brewster,
a private all white school, after visiting the school submitted all the appli-
cation forms that had been supplied them, along with a medical certificate
and check. The school returned to them their check and Colin's medical
certificate along with a form letter stating that the school was "unable to
accommodate the application." Colin and his parents are black, and al-
though those representing the school denied that Colin was rejected be-
cause of his race, the Gonzales court found that race was the basis for
Colin's rejection."
The Gonzales court found that the plaintiff had been denied his right
to make a contract, and therefore rendered a decision in his favor under
42 U.S.C. § 1981.1 In addition, the court found that it was not necessary
for the plaintiff to show any state action in order to invoke Section 1981,
relying on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. '9 as authority for that conclusion. 0
14. The Supreme Court has not yet determined just how far 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may be
extended to enforce one's right to make a contract. The possibility of constitutional conflicts
occurring in this area would appear inevitable. Therefore, it would appear to be necessary
for the Supreme Court to determine this issue and thereby give lower courts direction in this
area.
15. Civil Action No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July 27, 1973).
16. The sole basis of the action is 42 U.S.C. § 1981. There were no allegations whatsoever
that any state action was involved.
17. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973) (Bryan, Jr., J.):
In conclusion, the three Reisses [the Chairman of the Board, the Administrative
Director, and the registrar] all denied that it was the school or day camp's policy to
exclude an applicant because of his race. The Court rejects this testimony as unbeliev-
able and finds that the reason for the rejection was because Colin was black. Id. at 3.
Several other parties were involved in another case which the court consolidated with the
Gonzales case. Mr. and Mrs. McCrary and their son Michael brought an action against
Bobbe's School upon a very similar fact situation.
The Southern Independent School Association intervened as a party-defendant in the
action against Bobbe's asserting that it represents "non-profit, private white schools
in seven states and the class of all similarly situated schools and their associated
students and parents."
The intervenor takes a different tack from that of the principal defendants. It con-
cedes that race is a factor in its policies of exclusiveness, but says that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
cannot be used to compel admission of a black child to a white school of the type it
represents, and prays an adjudication to that effect. Id. at 5-6.
18. Id. at 6-7.
19. 392 U.S. 409, 423-24 (1968).
20. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A, 7 (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973).
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Furthermore, the "private" character of the schools involved was re-
jected.2
The weight of authority is in agreement with the Gonzales decision with
respect to its finding that Section 1981 prohibits private discrimination
which denies blacks the right to make a contract.2 2 It has been found that
state action is no longer required to assert the mandate of Section 1981.?
However, a small minority of cases has continued to see state action as a
requirement for invoking Section 1981.24
In Tillnan v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,2 the Supreme
Court found that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was applicable to prohibit discrimina-
tion by a "private club," and by virtue of that finding decided that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 would also be applicable. 2 That decision is a strong indica-
tion that the Gonzales analysis of Section 1981, as it relates to the question
of state action, is definitely the correct approach. Therefore, the fact that
state action is not a requirement allows the court to bring the defendant
"private" schools within the scope of Section 1981.?
21. Id.
22. See cases cited note 11 supra; Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An
Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). This court
relied upon its own historical analysis of section 1981 and upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), in concluding that "[n]othing in this
history shows any congressional intent in 1870 or in 1874 not to rely upon the Thirteenth
Amendment or to restrict what is now § 1981 to cases involving state action." Young v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., supra at 759-60.
24. See, e.g., Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on other
grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). The Cook court arrived at the conclusion that section
1981 was actually enacted under section 16 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act, and not derived from
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Therefore, the court reasoned that section 1981 was passed
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, and that under such circumstances a requirement
of state action was necessary. Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 518
(N.D. Okla. 1970). The court stated: "Absent any clear ruling by the United States Supreme
Court to the contrary, the Court is constrained to preserve the long-standing general construc-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as extending only to such actions, or omissions to act under 'color of
state law'." Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Tennessee v. Hartman, 303 F. Supp. 411 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969). But see Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justifica-
tion for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1037-39 (1972).
25. 93 S. Ct. 1090 (1973).
26. Id. at 1095. The Court stated:
In light of the historical interrelationship between § 1981 and § 1982, we see no reason
to construe these sections differently when applied, on these facts, to the claim of
Wheaton-Haven that it is a private club. Consequently, our discussion and rejection
of Wheaton-Haven's claim that it is exempt from § 1982 disposes of the argument that
Wheaton-Haven is exempt from § 1981.
27. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July
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In Gonzales Judge Bryan, Jr., applying the Supreme Court's reasoning,2
found that there was no "plan or purpose of exclusiveness. . . .there being
no selective element other than race, 29 in the schools' admission policies,
and that under such circumstances the schools in question were not "truly
private."" Furthermore, the fact that the schools are advertised in the
yellow pages gives support to the court's finding that they were not truly
private . 3 The court also found that "the opportunity to attend these
schools was open to every white child, 3 2 and therefore concluded, relying
on the Supreme Court's prior reasoning, 33 that Section 1981 could be ap-
plied to enforce the plaintiffs' right to contract.3 4 The Supreme Court used
this reasoning in part to show that Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association
and Little Hunting Park, Inc. were not truly private clubs, and that since
they were not truly private, Sections 1981 and 1982 were not to be held
inapplicable by virtue of the private club exemption of the public accom-
modations law.33 This is not an issue in the Gonzales case,3 but the court's
finding that the schools are not truly private is important in overcoming
possible conflicts between the constitutional prohibition of private racial
discrimination and the constitutionally guaranteed rights of liberty and
voluntary association.3 7
27, 1973). "Neither school receives any assistance, financial or otherwise, from any state, local
or federal agency; and each relies entirely on funds derived from tuition paid by students to
support its operations." Id. at 1.
28. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
29. Id. at 236.
30. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973). The opinion went on to say:
It is difficult to accept the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs may not have been
qualified to meet their school's high standards. This answer is certainly unavailing
with regard to the day camp or nursery and is suspect insofar as the first grade is
concerned since Colin Gonzales, because of his race, was never given the opportunity
to demonstrate that he was qualified. Id. at 7-8.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson Lake Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
32. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A, 7 (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973).
33. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 93 S. Ct. 1090 (1973); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Both these cases were concerned with "private" clubs.
The Supreme Court found that in both cases membership in the clubs was open to any whites
living within the designated geographic area. The Supreme Court reasoned that since mem-
bership was primarily predicated upon being white and living within the designated areas,
the clubs in question were not truly private clubs.
34. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973).
35. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 93 S. Ct. 1090, 1094-95 (1973); Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 236-38 (1969); See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
36. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A, 9 (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973).
37. See Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study of Law in
1974]
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Judge Bryan, Jr. is not alone in extending Section 1981 beyond the
employment context.3 8 But, the Gonzales decision does vastly broaden the
scope of Section 1981. Its effect will be to cause all private schools to
question the validity of their admission policies. It is important to note
however that Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination only.39 There-
fore, schools which make their selection process in reliance on subjective
standards other than race would not come within the scope of Section
1981.40
The Gonzales decision aids in the conclusion that the vital issue concern-
ing Section 1981 is no longer whether state action is or is not a requirement,
but to what extent a broadening of the scope of Section 1981 may conflict
with the constitutional rights of liberty, property, privacy and voluntary
association." In Gonzales, the defendants' refusal to make a contract with
the plaintiffs was a result of discrimination based solely upon the plain-
tiffs' race,4 2 and not upon any "individualized associational concerns.
4 3
Therefore, it would appear that the court's extension of Section 1981 to the
private school setting is valid. The Supreme Court has indicated that
citizens do have the right, in some circumstances, to discriminate against
Search of Morality, 56 IOWA L. REv. 473 (1971); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 496 (1962). In reference to possible constitutional
conflicts, Henkin states:
Increasing equality of the races is the direction of the Constitution. But if the Constitu-
tion today weighs on the side of equality, claims of liberty-even of liberty to discrimi-
nate on account of race-are not without constitutional protection. Id. at 489.
38. See, e.g., Grier v. Specialized Skills Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971). The court
found in this case, that the plaintiffs, who were black, did have a right, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, to make and enforce a contract to enter the defendant's barber training school.
The majority of cases involving the right to contract under section 1981 have been involved
with employment situations where there has been racial discrimination on the part of an
employer. See, e.g., Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Young v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970);
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
39. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A, 7 (E.D. Va., July
27, 1973). See Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1019, 1035 (1969).
40. See Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1035 (1969).
41. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473
(1962): "There is ... a small area of liberty favored by the Constitution even over claims to
equality. Rights of liberty and property, of privacy and voluntary association, must be bal-
anced .. " Id. at 496.
42. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., Civil Action No. 494-72-A, 3, 7 (E.D. Va.,
July 27, 1973).
43. Buchanan, supra note 37, at 509, 526-27.
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others." The Supreme Court will have to determine just how far Section
1981 may be extended to enforce one's right to make a contract.45 It is
possible that the Gonzales case will serve as the instrument with which the
Supreme Court may draw more specific constitutional guidelines in this
delicate area of the law.
J.G.C.
44. Norwood v. Harrison, 93 S. Ct. 2804 (1973): "Invidious private discrimination may be
characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amend-
ment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections." Id. at 2813. It
is important to note however, that this case was not concerned with 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
nor was it concerned with discrimination by private individuals.
45. Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971). It was found, in
this case, that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was applicable to enforce the plaintiff's right to make a
contract, but the court further stated:
It is not assumed that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. and Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park have answered all the unforeseen questions which may arise as to discrimination
in contract matters vis-a-vis the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and Sections
1981 and 1982. Nor should they be read to portend the complete irrelevance of "state
action" in assessing the constitutionality or legality of discriminatory conduct. Absent
state action or express constitutional prohibition, personal discrimination in a variety
of private matters is a continuing and natural aspect of constitutional freedom; liberty
must find room for diversity, narrowness and peculiarity, so long as they do not impose
upon others. Id. at 863.
See Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study of Law in Search of
Morality, 56 IowA L. REv. 473 (1971); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the
"State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUmi. L. REv. 855 (1966).
These articles all deal, in part, with possible conflicts between civil rights legislation and
other constitutionally guaranteed rights.
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